Studies in the Maternal, 6(1), 2014, www.mamsie.bbk.ac.uk that reading the psycho-drama of Skyfall according to Jacques Derrida's logic of autoimmunity allows a greater (though rather uncertain) chance that both critic and text might reproduce their symptomatic protocols otherwise, without the ossifying assurance that their meaning and/or pleasures will be underwritten by the (non)existence of perfect accord between self and other.
Certainly , the film makes an interesting limit case for the cultural logic of 'reproductive futurism' which Edelman famously outlines in No Future. On the one hand, it seems to support Edelman's claims about the imaginary defences we erect in the name of the future. Briefly, reproductive futurism names a cultural fantasy which allows the social order to avoid confronting the lack of meaning, the fragmentation and division at the heart of our sense of ourselves as social subjects. That unattainable meaning is believed to be only temporarily deferred into the future, where the guarantee of its fulfilment is represented by the figure of the innocent child, for whose future happiness and security all political causes of left and right are fighting. Following Lacan, Edelman argues that reproductive futurism must above all deny its own death drive: that meaningless drift of desire through the materiality of the undead letter of the law; 'a movement beyond the pleasure principle, beyond the distinctions of pleasure and pain, a violent passage beyond the bounds of identity, meaning and law. ' (NF, p.25) Reproductive futurism denies its implication in this uncanny, mortifying process by splitting off its death drive into the figure of the Queer: it therefore 'conjures homosexuality, and with it the definitional importance of sex in our imagining of homosexuality, in intimate relation to a fatal, and even murderous, jouissance'. (NF, p.39) In response, Edelman argues, those communities which find themselves thus abjected must embrace an ethical position of queer oppositionality which fully assumes this figural association between the death drive and the category of homosexuality. For this Queer (anti)subjectivity he coins the term sinthomosexual, a portmanteau which plays on Lacan's sinthome, the term he used in his final seminars for a particular, unique symptom which is at the core of any subject and which ensures their access, not to a fully meaningful place in the symbolic order, but to enjoyment, jouissance. Edelman announces that sinthomosexual should assume a properly ethical stance by disrupting any faith in a '"final signifier" that will make meaning whole at last […] and insisting on access to jouissance in place of access to sense. ' (NF, p.37) This profound shift, from believing in the meaning of one's neurotic symptom to identifying with that symptom, recognising it as the basic structure of your identity, is what Studies in the Maternal, 6(1), 2014, www.mamsie.bbk.ac.uk Lacan was apparently aiming at with his concept of the sinthome. Lacanian critics from Slavoj Zizek to Edelman accord the concept a decisive subversive power when applied to cultural analysis, a power which is regularly contrasted with the insufficiency of deconstructive readings which are said to remain fixated on the 'discursive' effects of ideology without touching 'the last support of the ideological effect […] the nonsensical, preideological kernel of enjoyment'. 5 In Zizek's view, which Edelman keenly endorses in No Future, the decisive step in an effective critical reading must be to 'articulat[e] the way in which an ideology, implies, manipulates, produces' (SO, p.140) this minimal structure within which a subject experiences desire. Skyfall struck me as inviting such a critical procedure, but inviting it a little too keenly, much like the movie's villain, who willingly allows himself to be captured by the MI6 to penetrate the weakness in the British security apparatus and return to the quasimaternal figure, Judi Dench's M, in an obscene moment of incestuous eroticism and death.
II
At the time of its cinema run, Stephen Wright wrote an interesting article (one of few critical readings of the film that I have come across) discussing the Bond character's "psychotic misogyny" through a Lacanian reading focused on the foreclosure of the symbolic Father function in Bond's backstory. Though this reading often falls victim to the old psychoanalytic fallacy of treating the central character as a clinical case history, Wright makes an observation which is decisive for my reading: the film is 'uncanny in speaking to its own dynamics'. Sadly he then pulls back from the idea that the makers of such a deeply reactionary movie could actually be one step ahead of its radical psychoanalytic critics:
I'd be fairly sure that Sam Mendes and Barbara Broccoli didn't come up with a detailed storyboard that centred around the Name of the Father or a Žižekian commentary on Lacan. But in trying to make Bond speak beyond his own image of the sexually magnetic, suave, hi-tech, self-contained superspy, they have unwittingly revealed something (something which has also been immensely profitable for them). This paper will explore some of these implications which Wright chooses to ignore.
In particular, I am interested in the way in which the movie enacts the shift proper to Lacan's notion of 'traversing the fantasy' in relation to deeply conservative dreams about British identity: exposing the nostalgic belief in British imperial greatness to ridicule, revealing the exploitative logic behind it, and synecdochally associating it to Bond's aging body and the outdated methods of Judi Dench's septuagenarian head of MI6, then ultimately reconnecting its audience to their enjoyment of a British nationalism shorn of any neurotic need to make sense or to justify its claims to cultural superiority. Again Wright is astute in highlighting M's kitsch porcelain bulldog as a 'pivotal image' in the film. After an explosion destroys the iconic MI6 building, forcing the security apparatus underground (returning to the site of WWII operations and of course symbolically reconnecting with the psyche), Bond sees the Bulldog in its usual position on M's new desk and expresses his disgust that this piece of tourist tat should have survived when so much of real value has been destroyed or lost -but of course at this point in the movie Bond is officially unfit for duty! At the movie's close Bond gladly receives the bulldog from M as a posthumous gift, and at that moment he is no longer caught in labyrinthine underground tunnels. He stands silhouetted in black against a shimmering rooftop view of Westminster's imperious skyline from the domed towers of the Old War
Office in the near right of the screen to the Houses of Parliament in the far distance, his gaze (and the viewers') directed towards a single union flag placed harmoniously between the two.
His ability to resume his official position within the state apparatus and within an iconic scene of enduring British power is bizarrely contingent on this cheap, and degradingly commodified object. In Lacanian terms, it makes sense to think of the Bulldog as the ultimate embodiment Defusing the uncanny threat of the Other by repeating it as coherent narrative. But, before
Bond's diligent researches are rewarded with fresh intelligence, Raoul tells him a good oldfashioned story, as he strolls delicately towards the camera in a tremulously steady long shot, sensuous, gentle lips and blazing eyes gradually coming into our view for the first time. But his voice is already prominent, echoing around the cinema auditorium way ahead of his image. And the voice is telling the story of his childhood, the summers on his grandmother's island, which had seemed an unstained paradise until the threat of contagion loomed. The story seems like the most personal, private, individual of recollections, but as its speaker comes into view we realise that its intent is to radically desubjectify its hearer, and simultaneously to illuminate the autoimmune logic of state security. It goes like this:
Raoul: One summer we went for a visit and discovered the place had been infested with rats. They'd come on a fishing boat and gorged themselves on coconut. So how do you get rats off an island, hmm? My grandmother showed me. We buried an oil drum and hinged the lid. Then we wired coconut to the lid as bait, and the rats would come for the coconut -donk-donk-donk-donk-donk, they would fall into the drum. subjectivises the more abstract evils of the other terms. And Raoul asks Bond to choose pure pleasure over the illusory sense of duty, just as the sinthome allows Lacan to provide a kind of authentic ground for the subject in the real of its desire and therefore to 'specify the decision-making process of the subject' 9 who can now 'choose' between belief in or identification with his symptoms. Choosing to go on believing in the elusive meaning of the symptom is clearly not the option that a Lacanian is rooting for; 'It can barely be considered an identity, since it shifts continuously through the chain of signifiers -hence the typical hysterical question: "Who am I?"' By contrast, an Edelmanly heroic identification with the brute force of the symptom ensures that, 'through identification with the letter, fixating the jouissance, the subject acquires a Real identity, connecting it to the Real of its being.' (VD, p.68)
IV
However, who is to say that the hysterical mode with its incessant, unreasonable faith in the symbolic would be the wrong option, particularly for those of us who would like to reshape the prevailing symbolic rather than succeed from it? Bruce Fink, for example, argues that the only way to rescue Lacan from the deconstructive critique of his phallogocentric system, is to read Lacan 'hysterically', i.e. as someone who has chosen on the side of belief rather than an identity fixed in the Real:
[W]e can adopt an hysterical stance -one perhaps closer to Lacan's own -and say that Lacan himself does not view his own texts as constituting any kind of finished theory or system.
[…] He sees his own work as grappling with certain problems and as trying ever anew to forge new concepts and schemas by which to get a handle on the Freudian Field, and he does not want his terms to be taken out of context and put to foreign uses. 10 Could we say that not only has Edelman betrayed Lacan by taking the signifer 'sinthome' from its assigned place and putting it to 'foreign' use, but in so doing he has also committed himself, against the letter of his own thesis, to continue the hysterical search for adequate signifiers for our subjective positions?
Is the sinthomosexual, then, less a polymorphously perverse threat to the status quo, than an hysterical response to it? And hasn't Edelman's work been enthusiastically received, challenged and explored for exactly that reason? In The Ticklish Subject Zizek includes an interesting discussion of the political consequences of the 'pathological' psycho-sexual forms in their relation to homosexuality which, though written several years before Edelman' […] It is interesting to note how, when one describes new phenomena one as a rule overlooks their predominant hysterical functioning and prefers the allegedly more 'radical' perverse or psychotic functioning. Say in the case of cyberspace, we are bombarded with interpretations which emphasise how cyberspace opens up the possibilities of polymorphous perverse playing with and permanent reshaping of one's symbolic identity, or how it involves a regression to the psychotic incestuous immersion in the Screen as the maternal Thing that swallows us, depriving us of the capacity of symbolic distance and reflection. It can, however, be argued that the most common reaction of all of us when we are confronted with cyberspace is still that of hysterical perplexity, of permanent questioning: 'How do I stand with respect to this In Skyfall, and here we return to the idea of the sinthomosexual, we soon discover that the film has invited Bond to make this false choice between jouissance and belief, allowing us to fall into the same misapprehension as Foucault or Edelman -we want to see Raoul as polymorphously perverse. As Bond defied the threat of his homosexual object choice, Raoul shifted the ground discursively to his mastery of illicit cybertech knowledge and the power this gives him over the Other. But this is a bluff. We soon learn that at this stage he is merely playing at mastery, he wants Bond to capture him and carry him into the heart of MI6 where he will confront Judi Dench's M; hysterically, he will do anything to communicate with her. viewed as a belated displacement of homophobic anxiety which has been pushed to the very limit of its audience's tolerance for purposes of dramatic tension, or as a wake-up call to those who believe that their sexuality is inherently threatening to liberal state power, though I personally incline towards the latter reading. If we read Raoul as a sinthomosexual, our reading perhaps can go no further than the former position, from which viewpoint his sexuality is a scandal which must be disguised in the discourses of nation, self-presence, etc.
To disrupt the reproduction of the British hero it should then be enough for the critic to by Derrida in an interview he gave in the wake of 9/11. A shadowy figure who inflicts symbolic wounds on the American, liberal-capitalist hegemony less by physical force than by the 'deconstructive' violence they figure against the whole conceptual and technological apparatus which maintains the dominant power. As Derrida puts it:
the "total" threat, no longer comes from a state but from anonymous forces that are absolutely unforeseeable and incalculable. […] it threatens what is supposed to sustain world order, the very possibility of a world and of any worldwide effort [mondialisation] (international law, a world market, a universal language, and so on), what is thus put at risk by this terrifying autoimmunitary logic is nothing less than the existence of the world […] When Bush and his associates blame "the axis of evil," we ought both to smile at and denounce the religious connotations, the childish stratagems, the obscurantist mystifications of this inflated rhetoric. And yet there is in fact, and from every quarter, an absolute "evil" whose threat, whose shadow, is spreading. Absolute evil, absolute threat, because what is at stake is nothing less than the mondialisation or the worldwide movement of the world, life on earth and elsewhere. 16 Two associations, two uncanny doublings. Firstly, I think we can say, without too much queering of the evidence, that Raoul the rogue agent represents the kind of 'absolute evil' Derrida is describing: a product of the deterritorialisation of a knowledge-based semiocapitalist order, whose 'shadow' spreads across the fantasy space of Skyfall as it does across the prevailing authorities -be they states, financial institutions, or pedagogic disciplines. And then there is Derrida's metaphor of autoimmunity -the pathologically-derived idea that unitary bodies (be they persons, states, or systems of thought) respond to the threat of contagion or destabilisation rather like Raoul's grandmother with her rats, not simply by Studies in the Maternal, 6(1), 2014, www.mamsie.bbk.ac.uk trying to exterminate or deport the threat, but instead to 'produce, invent, and feed the very monstrosity they claim to overcome'. They produce the very thing which threatens them, in order to inoculate themselves against it, thereby 'reproducing, and regenerating the very thing they seek to disarm'. (AI, p.99) But, another doubling here, this 'total threat' which the USA and its allies name 'terrorism' mirrors Derridean deconstruction to the extent that it attaches itself to the dominant, phallogocentric body of knowledge, and destabilises the contradictions and violent repressions which sustain it. Perhaps uncomfortable with the proximity of his own work to his diagnosis of the absolute threat, Derrida categorically opposes himself to the symbolic violence of Al-Qa'ida:
What appears to me unacceptable in the "strategy" (in terms of weapons, practices, ideology, rhetoric, discourse, and so on) […] is, above all, the fact that such actions and such discourse open onto no future, and in my view, have no future. If we are to put any faith in the perfectibility of public space and of the world juridico-political scene, of the "world" itself, then there is, it seems to me, nothing good to be hoped for from that quarter. (AI, p.113)
In a recent article, Lee Edelman has critiqued Derrida, and the aforementioned quote in particular, for its complicity with the fantasy of reproductive futurism. Edelman accuses
Derrida of projecting the nihilism of Deconstruction into the symbolic figure of Osama Bin
Laden, of positioning himself on the side of 'the Good' in identification with the juridicopolitical order, betraying the original ethical violence of Deconstruction. Edelman concludes that Derrida has revealed himself as a dissimulating liberal (but then, aren't we all, sometimes?), and excludes him from the club of truly radical thinkers. Edelman's 'Derrida' is a craven figure who acknowledges here no future but an evolutionary one, which is also to say an evolution precisely toward the condition of the One, toward an "absolute law" associated with "universal sovereignty" that utopically moves toward the perfection of justice, political order, and the "world" we know. Lacan, like Badiou, like the queer, like the figure of "bin Ladenism" adduced by Derrida (and unlike bin Laden himself ), denies this evolutionary model in favor of the death drive's creation ex nihilo, refusing the instinct of conservation that by anticipating the future prevents it, allowing it recognition only in a form already known. 17 I agree with Edelman that Derrida is disavowing the proximity of deconstruction and the symbolic violence of terrorism which he sketches. Though perhaps this is an understandable, even a respectful gesture, given that he was speaking in New York a few short weeks after the 'deconstruction' of the Twin Towers. 18 Furthermore, in the context of our discussion it is extremely relevant that Derrida talks about belief ('faith') in the perfectibility of the social order, not as an ontological ground (the level of the Real which Edelman kindly maps for us) There is a proviso that one is knowingly making a forced choice, i.e. making oneself the subject of an action which de jure and de facto is determined by one's drive fixations, whether one likes it or not: 'the only -but crucial and highest -freedom I am granted in drive is the freedom to choose the inevitable, freely to embrace my Destiny, which will happen to me in any case.' (TS, p.299) Nevertheless, in making the forced choice one apparently creates the possibility of the drives being satisfied otherwise, because one is no longer reliant on the foundational fantasy in the same manner:
[W]hen drive subjectifies itself, when the subject sees itself as the dreadful Thing, this other subjectivisation is, on the contrary, signalled by the sudden onset of silence -the idiotic babble of jouissance is interrupted, the subject disengages itself from its flow. Opening oneself to the unexpected always means opening oneself to the future, as
Edelman himself acknowledges when he says in his paper on Derrida that he would want to be (but of course cannot wholly be) someone who 'let[s] the future be by being what lets the future.' Yet, for me, Edelman's refusal of any future-oriented political modality does not represent a challenge to the structural violence of normativity. Indeed, Edelman seems to welcome a particularly poisonous kind of conservative discourse. I do not suggest that such figures do not exist in reality or represent an insignificant minority worldwide (would it were so!), only that Edelman's sinthomosexual requires the fascinated gaze of the bigot to assure the integrity of 'his' being. I'll quote him at ungainly length here since his homogenised discussion of the political consciousnesses of right and left wing subjects is worth dwelling on:
[T]he only queerness that queer sexualities could ever hope to signify would spring from their determined opposition to this underlying structure of the political -their opposition, that is, to the governing fantasy of achieving Symbolic closure through the marriage of identity to futurity in order to realise the social subject. Conservatives acknowledge this radical potential, which is also to say, this radical threat ['threat' is proudly italicised in the text] of queerness more fully than liberals, for conservatism pre-emptively imagines the wholesale rupturing of the symbolic fabric, whereas liberalism conservatively clings to a faith in its limitless elasticity. (NF, The cleanliness of this division, and the uncritical dogmatism with which he identifies an archetypal conservative logic and a complementary liberal one, somewhat belies his assertion that queerness 'can never define an identity; it can only ever disturb one ' (NF, p.17) . If that proposition were true, Edelman's vision of politics would have to be a wearily straight one.
Anyway, he continues straight on along this dividing line, but as he does so one should note the slippage from a contrast of binary conservative and liberal psycho-caricatures to a supposedly complementary division between the left and the right;
The right […] better sees the inherently conflictual aspect of identities, the constant danger that they face in alterity, the psychic anxiety with which they are lived; but the left better recognises history's persistent rewriting of those identities, finding hope in the fact that identity's borders are never fully fixed. The left in this is always right from the point of view of reason, but left in the shade by its reason is the darkness inseparable from its light: the defensive structure of the ego, the rigidity of identity as experienced by the subject, and the fixity of the Imaginary relation through which we reproduce ourselves. (NF, p.14)
It hardly seems necessary to point out historical instances where agents of the political right have disavowed the tensions inherent to the social order, splitting off the antagonistic element into some marginal group, and projecting a vision of social harmony into a utopic future where that queer stain has been wiped clean. But I would suggest that, against the avowed intention of his argument, Edelman does not want to shatter a social imaginary in which male-male sexuality is condemned, and those identified as queer attacked symbolically and physically; he too wants to fix the (male) homosexual subject in the righteous posture of the martyr to Truth, to the truth of the Lacanian Real. Affecting requisite irony, he hammers home the final lines of No Future with violent declaratives, before assuring us that the threatcum-promise of the future actually 'is always happening', now, in the present progressive:
Somewhere, someone else will be savagely beaten and left to die -sacrificed to a future whose beat goes on, like a pulse or a heart -and another corpse will be left like a mangled scarecrow to frighten the birds who are gathering now, who are beating their wings, and who, like the drive, keep on coming. (NF p.154) So Edelman invites the blows to keep on coming -sacrifice me, make my queer undead text into your scarecrow, fixing me forever as a symbol of radical threat to a structure which can never radically change. What such a posture avoids, for surely it is the immobile posture of the scarecrow that Edelman desires, is the anxiety which the openness of a future aspect exposes us to in the present. It is when we speak of the future that the impossibility of assuring our position haunts us, whether that position be framed as symbolic, imaginary or real. As Derrida puts it; 'It is the future that determines the unappropriability of the event, not the present or the past.' No Future, then, must also mean no alarms and no surprises.
24
The blows which the social order 'will always' reign down on the figure of its own death drive become numbing in Edelman's formulation, rather than a sharp pain which may jolt us to care, to resist, to fight, to protect, to unite, to break away -maybe to enjoy our subjection, but hopefully to change it.
VII
To return to the Bond movie, I have argued that in a limited sense it is possible to read Skyfall through the prism of sinthomosexuality. To do so we have all the tools for critique neatly laid out and we have only to find examples of the figural position of homosexuality as the container for the queer, evil, death-bringing doubling Bond, who must be killed so that Bond can return to 'life', fully invested in his symbolic role once again. All this fits neatly with the idea that reproductive futurism always treats the queer as a security threat, to be eliminated by any means. However, one should remember that the movie firmly establishes Bond's own queer side (which is sometimes heavily alluded to in Ian Fleming's writing, but hitherto occluded in the movies), Raoul shows Bond an image of himself 'barely held together by your pills and your drink' (to which Bond buoyantly adds, 'Don't forget my pathetic love of country'), and reads Bond his psychological evaluation, concealed from him by MI6, which states that he is officially unfit for duty due to his physical frailty and his 'pathological rejection of authority, based on unresolved childhood trauma'.
Queer as Bond is, unmarried, without children or relatives of any kind -the movie continually reminds us of this -these are the very qualities for which the secret service values him. As Raoul's parable has it, he is a rat who has been trained to desire the flesh of other rats, and therefore to desire the death of the entire plague which the rat community With pleasure.' His reply is accompanied with a facial twitch which is equal parts respectful smile and half ironic smirk. Patriotic pride is so deeply instilled in his psyche that recognising its absurdity only heightens Bond's libidinal fidelity. In the shadowy realms of his obscene capacity to enjoy bringing death, Bond needs Britain, needs Britain's desire for him. At the end of the film he is able to reconcile his queerness to his position within the institution that uses his perverse death drive to maintain itself against similar rogue elements -and a caption flashes up on screen: '50 years: James Bond will return'. , missing the fact that 'what is even less thinkable than queer negativity is the social itself, comprised as it is of the unstable split between the public and the private.' (NRF, p.14) Likewise, eschewing a reading of the movie focused on the way the sinthomosexual supposedly disrupts the fundamental fantasy, we see an autoimmune logic at the heart of Bond's triadic relationship with Raoul and the British security edifice which encourages us to believe that this very public/private, inside-outside split must be coming apart in order for a movie like Skyfall to emerge, barely held together by Bond's pills and drink and its disillusioned view of transgressive violence and sexuality. What would be truly transgressive would be a Bond movie in which the hero (or the creative team) not only recognised that everything Bond fights for has been stripped of meaning, leaving only the compulsive repetitions of the death drive, but then attended faithfully to the shifting boundaries of identity, the self attacking the self, yes, but more radically threatening the delimitations of self and other, of foreign body and interior defences such that if 'autoimmunity is more or less suicidal, [...] more seriously still it threatens always to rob suicide itself of its meaning and supposed integrity. ' (R, p.45) Read this way, can one see hysterical, autoimmunitary modes of errant social reproduction at war inside the body of the film that its narrative frame scarcely contains? As
Studies in the Maternal, 6(1), 2014, www.mamsie.bbk.ac.uk critical readers we should perhaps avoid the desire to give an omniscient answer to this question, lest we succumb to penetration anxiety. The experience of consuming Skyfall generated a good deal of anxiety in me; writing about it for your eyes, only more so. It is a dangerous text, perhaps more so than many more overtly radical artistic responses to the contemporary decline of nation states and symbolic authorities. A dangerously insistent symptom, resistant to both medication and ready-made critical analyses, it will not let up until we make some profound lifestyle changes. Skyfall should not be interpreted presumptuously, nor dismissed -for the moment, it should be carefully attended to. It's available now on DVD, Blu Ray and digital download.
